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Abstract
We study optimal bidding strategies for advertisers in sponsored search auctions. In general,
these auctions are run as variants of second-price auctions but have been shown to be incentive
incompatible. Thus, advertisers have to be strategic about bidding. Uncertainty in the decisionmaking environment, budget constraints and the presence of a large portfolio of keywords makes
the bid optimization problem non-trivial. We present an analytical model to compute the optimal bids for keywords in an advertiser’s portfolio. To validate our approach, we estimate the
parameters of the model using data from an advertiser’s sponsored search campaign and use
the bids proposed by the model in a ﬁeld experiment. The results of the ﬁeld implementation
show that the proposed bidding technique is very eﬀective in practice. We extend our model
to account for interactions between keywords, in the form of positive spillovers from generic
keywords into branded keywords. The spillovers are estimated using a dynamic linear model
framework and used to jointly optimize the bids of the keywords using an approximate dynamic
programming approach. Accounting for the interaction between keywords leads to an additional
improvement in the campaign performance.
Keywords: Sponsored search, search engine marketing, bid optimization, stochastic optimization, stochastic modeling
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Introduction

With the growing popularity of search engines among consumers, advertising on search engines has
also grown considerably. Search engine advertising or sponsored search has several unique characteristics in contrast to traditional advertising and other forms of online advertising. Compared to
traditional advertising in print/television, sponsored search is highly measurable allowing advertisers to identify which keywords are generating clicks and which clicks are getting converted to
purchases. Compared to other forms of online advertising such as banner ads, search advertising
enjoys much higher click-through (CTR) and conversion rates. Search queries entered by users
convey signiﬁcant information about users current need and context which allow search engines
to better target ads to users than is possible in other forms of online advertising. Further, search
engine users, unlike users on another websites, primarily use the search engine to reach some other
website. Advertising is an eﬀective way to enable that process.
Search engines commonly use Pay Per Click (PPC) auctions to sell their available inventory
of ad positions for any search query. The auction mechanism is referred to as the Generalized
Second Price (GSP) auction. In these auctions, advertisers select keywords of interest, create brief
text ads for the keywords and submit a bid for each keyword which indicates their willingness to
pay for every click. For example, a meat seller may submit the following set of two tuples {(pork
chop, $2), (ﬁllet mignon, $5), (steak deals, $3),...} where the ﬁrst element in any two-tuple is the
keyword and the second element is the advertiser’s bid. Large advertisers typically bid on hundreds
of thousands of keywords at any instant. When a user types a query, the search engine identiﬁes all
advertisers bidding on that (or a closely related) keyword and displays their ads in an ordered list.
The search engine uses the advertisers’ bids along with measures of ad relevance to rank order the
submitted ads. Whenever a consumer clicks on an ad in a given position, the search engine charges
the corresponding advertiser a cost per click (CPC) which is the minimum bid needed to secure that
position. The auctions are continuous sealed bid auctions. That is, advertisers can change their
bids at any time and cannot observe the bids of their competitors. Typically advertisers are only
given summary reports with details such as the total number of impressions, clicks and conversions,
average rank and average CPC for each keyword on a given day. Several of these auctions are very
competitive. For example, it is not uncommon to have 100 or more advertisers bidding for the
same keyword. The average CPC on search engines has been continually rising over the last couple
of years and search advertising is increasingly becoming a major advertising channel for a large
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number of ﬁrms.
The GSP auction described above diﬀers from traditional auctions in a number of ways. First,
search engines display multiple ads in response to a user query. However, the auction cannot be
treated as a multi-unit auction because each ad position is diﬀerent in the sense that top positions
generate more clicks for the same number of ad impressions. Further, the CPC decreases as the
rank of an ad increases (i.e. the CPC is higher for top ranked ad than a lower ranked ad). Thus,
the advertiser has to trade-oﬀ a higher number of clicks attained at a top position against the lower
margin per click. Due to this trade-oﬀ, it may sometimes be better for an advertiser to underbid
and sacriﬁce a few clicks in order to get a higher margin per click. Indeed, several authors have
demonstrated that popular second-price search auctions such as those used by Google and Yahoo
are not incentive compatible (Aggarwal et al., 2006, Edelman et al., 2007). Thus, bidding one’s
true valuation is often suboptimal. Further, advertisers have short-term budget constraints which
imply that bids cannot be submitted independently for keywords. For example, if the advertiser
submits a very high bid for the keyword “ﬁllet mignon” then it may leave a very limited portion
of the budget for another keyword. The performance of the keywords may also be interdependent,
wherein clicks for one keyword may help generate more searches and clicks for another. Therefore
the bids for the thousands of keywords are inextricably linked. Finally, considerable uncertainty
exists in the sponsored search environment. For example, the number of queries for “ﬁllet mignon”
on any given day is stochastic and is a function of the weather, special events and a variety of other
unknown factors. Similarly, consumer click behavior cannot be precisely predicted and the bids
of competitors are also unknown due to the sealed bid nature of the auction. The stochasticity
in query arrival, consumer click behavior and competitors’ bids imply that the number of clicks
and total cost associated with any bid are all stochastic. All these factors - namely the incentive
incompatibility of the auction, budget constraints, large portfolio of keywords with interdependent
performance and uncertainty in the decision environment - make the advertiser’s problem of bidding
in sponsored search a non-trivial optimization problem. In this paper, we formulate and solve the
advertiser’s decision problem.
We propose two bidding policies in our paper. The ﬁrst policy ignores the interaction between
keywords and is referred to as the “myopic” policy in this paper. We extend this bidding policy to
incorporate interaction between keywords, and refer to this policy as the “forward-looking” policy
since it entails decision making over several time horizons. Depending on the advertiser’s intent,
level of sophistication and nature of the products being advertised, the advertiser might choose the
2

myopic or the forward-looking policy. This paper makes three main contributions. The ﬁrst contribution is towards improving managerial practice. Advertisers spend billions of dollars on sponsored
search. An entire industry of Search Engine Marketing (SEM) ﬁrms have emerged that provide
bid management services. The techniques described in the paper can help increase the Return on
Investment (RoI) for advertisers and SEM ﬁrms, as demonstrated in our ﬁeld implementation. The
second key contribution is that our approach represents a signiﬁcant step forward for the academic
literature on bidding in multi-slot auctions. All the papers to date have studied the problem either
in a deterministic setting or in a single-slot setting and have relied on heuristic solution techniques
due to the complexity of the optimization problem. In contrast, we compute optimal bids in the
more realistic stochastic multi-slot setting. The third contribution of this paper is that it is the ﬁrst
paper on bidding in sponsored search to incorporate the interdependence between keywords into a
multi-period bidding problem. The interdependence in keyword performance, commonly referred
to as spillovers, is a well-documented feature of sponsored search (Rutz and Bucklin, 2011) but has
not been considered in the bidding literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature
and position our work within the literature on sponsored search. In Section 3, we formulate the
problem, derive the optimality condition for the myopic policy and discuss how it may be used to
compute the optimal bids. In Section 4, we describe the dataset used for the analysis presented in
this paper. In Section 5, we present the empirical analysis where we estimate the parameters of
our model and run a ﬁeld experiment with the bids suggested by the myopic policy. We compare
the optimal bids computed by our model with those used by the ﬁrm and present results from
a ﬁeld implementation of the bids. We extend the myopic policy in Section 6 to incorporate
interdependence between keywords. Finally, we discuss some limitations of our work in Section 7
and conclude in Section 8.

2

Literature review

In this section, we review three streams of active research within the ﬁeld of sponsored search with
a particular emphasis on prior work on bidding in sponsored search.

3

Mechanism Design
Search engines run PPC auctions in which they charge advertisers whenever a consumer clicks on
an ad.1 A primary area of focus in sponsored search research has been the design of the auction
mechanism. Two important questions from a mechanism design perspective are the rules used to
rank order the ads and the rules used to determine the amount paid by advertisers. Feng et al. (2006)
compare the performance of various ad ranking mechanisms and ﬁnd that a yield-optimized auction,
that ranks ads based on the product of the submitted bid and ad relevance, provides the highest
revenue to the search engine. In terms of payment rules, Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) study ﬁrst
price sponsored search auctions in which advertisers pay the amount they bid and ﬁnd empirical
evidence of bidding cycles in such auctions. The authors indicate that a VCG-based mechanism
eliminates such bidding cycles and generates higher revenues for the search engine compared to the
ﬁrst price auction. In a related paper, Edelman et al. (2007) demonstrate that the commonly used
GSP auction, unlike Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, is not incentive compatible. Thus,
advertisers have to bid strategically even in the absence of budget constraints. Aggarwal et al.
(2006) propose a “laddered” auction mechanism that is incentive compatible but the mechanism
has not been adopted possibly due to the complexity of the payment rules. Mehta et al. (2007)
solve the problem of matching ad slots to advertisers using a generalization of the online bipartite
matching problem. Given advertisers’ bids and budget constraints, Mehta et al. (2007) provide a
deterministic algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio of 1 − 1/e for this problem.2 Mahdian
et al. (2007) extend this work and provide a solution which is nearly optimal when the frequencies
of keywords are accurately known and provides a good competitive ratio even when these estimates
are completely inaccurate. Aggarwal and Hartline (2006), on the other hand, model this problem as
a knapsack auction. However, they consider only truthful mechanism designs and analyze various
pricing schemes and the payoﬀs under each of these pricing schemes. Most of the above referenced
papers focus on the search engine’s problem and analyze how diﬀerent mechanisms aﬀect the search
engine’s revenues.
1

Other payment rules are also feasible. These include Pay Per Action (PPA) auctions in which advertisers are
charged only if the consumer performs a valid action such as a purchase. Hybrid schemes are also feasible. For
example, in the context of banner ads, Kumar et al. (2007) propose a hybrid pricing model based on a combination
of ad impressions and clicks.
2
Competitive ratio is the measure for comparing online algorithms to oﬄine algorithms where all the information
is known apriori.
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Consumer behavior in sponsored search
The sponsored search environment presents rich data on consumer behavior. Modeling user’s
propensity to click on ads and to purchase upon clicking is an important area of recent focus. Several
approaches have been proposed to model clicks for individual keywords and ads (Ali and Scarr,
2007, Craswell et al., 2008, Feng et al., 2006). Ali and Scarr (2007) compare several distributions
to predict click-through rates and suggest that Pareto-Zipf distribution is the most appropriate for
explaining CTR as a function of position. Feng et al. (2006) alternately assume an exponential
decay in CTR with position and demonstrate that the model ﬁts observed data well. Several other
papers build richer models of consumer behavior incorporating the eﬀect that ad attributes have
on click-through and conversion (Ghose and Yang, 2009, Yang and Ghose, 2010, Rutz et al., 2012,
Agarwal et al., 2011). Rutz and Bucklin (2011) propose a model that measures the interaction
between keywords and show that there are signiﬁcant positive spillovers from generic keywords to
branded keywords in consumer search.
Optimal Bidding in Sponsored Search
The stream of work closely related to our paper is that on budget constrained bidding in sponsored
search. Rusmevichientong and Williamson (2006) propose a model for selecting keywords from a
large pool of candidates. Their model does not however address optimal bidding for these keywords
and ignores the multi-slot context. Feldman et al. (2007) study the bid optimization problem and
indicate that randomizing between two uniform strategies that bid equally on all keywords works
well. The authors assume that all clicks have the same value independent of the keyword. Further,
their results are derived in a deterministic setting where the advertisers position, clicks and the
cost associated with a bid are known precisely. Borgs et al. (2007) propose a bidding heuristic that
sets the same average Return on Investment (RoI) across all keywords. Their model is also derived
for a deterministic setting. Finally, Muthukrishnan et al. (2007) study bidding in a stochastic
environment where there is uncertainty in the number of queries for any keyword. The authors
focus on a single slot auction and ﬁnd that preﬁx bidding strategies that bid on the cheapest
keywords work well in many cases. However, they ﬁnd that the strategies for single slot auctions
do not always extend to multi-slot auctions and that many cases are NP hard.
The prior work reveals three themes. The ﬁrst is that the literature on sponsored search mechanism design has established that GSP auctions are not incentive compatible. This feature combined
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with the advertiser’s budget constraint suggests a need to develop bidding policies. Secondly, the
empirical work in sponsored search provides a variety of useful models that can be applied towards
modeling consumer click behavior and the bidding behavior of advertisers. These can ultimately be
used to develop data-driven optimization strategies. Three, the issue of budget constrained bidding
has received some attention. While these early papers on bid optimization have helped advance
the literature, they tend to focus on deterministic settings or single slot auctions, both of which
are restrictive assumptions in the sponsored search context. None of these papers account for any
interdependence in keyword performance. Further, these papers develop heuristic strategies due to
the complexity of the optimization problem. In contrast, we determine optimal bids in a budgetconstrained multi-unit multi-slot auction under uncertainty in the decision-making environment.
We also extend our basic model to incorporate interaction between keywords.

3

Analytical Model

Advertisers usually maintain a portfolio of thousands of keywords for a particular search engine.
They submit bids for each keyword on a regular basis during a billing cycle. During each time
period when bids need to be computed, the bid management system accepts a budget for that time
period as an input and computes the bids for all keywords. We adopt the same framework and
focus on the bid optimization problem during a speciﬁc time period in which the budget and the set
of keywords have been speciﬁed.3 Although we consider the advertiser’s problem of optimizing the
bid for a particular search engine in this paper, our approach can be extended to multiple search
engines by treating each keyword-search engine pair as a unique keyword.
Ads placed in response to consumer search queries can play two roles for advertisers. They can
help generate purchases. Or they can help build awareness, which may translate into purchases
in later periods. Consumers often start their search process with generic search terms e.g. “ﬁllet
mignon”. Bidding on these generic keywords might help the advertiser generate brand-speciﬁc (or
retailer-speciﬁc) exposure. This in turn might enhance the awareness of a particular brand and can
lead to increased branded search activity (“spillover”). There is evidence of spillovers from generic
to branded keywords in sponsored search ads (Rutz and Bucklin, 2011).
In the paper, we propose two policies that can be used an advertisers to optimize the bids for
3

A common practice in the SEM industry is to use Daily Budget = (Remaining Balance)/(Number of days left in
cycle), where remaining balance is the initial monthly budget less the amount spent thus far. We do not focus on
how the budget for a given time period is computed and treat it as an exogenous parameter in our formulation.
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keywords in an advertising campaign. We begin by proposing a “myopic” bidding policy that solves
the one-shot decision problem of the advertiser which does not factor in indirect beneﬁts from
keywords such as awareness. We relax this assumption in Section 6 and incorporate interactions
between keywords. The bidding policy that incorporates interactions between keywords is referred
to as the “forward-looking” policy. The forward-looking policy solves the advertising problem in
a multi-period context. The motivation for developing two bidding policies is twofold. First, the
myopic policy is easier to implement and also relevant in the context of commoditized products
where branding is not very relevant. The complexity of a forward-looking policy may be unnecessary
for many advertisers. In addition, the forward-looking policy builds on the myopic policy and it
is useful for the purpose of exposition to outline the myopic policy ﬁrst. In this section, we ignore
spillovers between keywords and assume that the keywords are independent.

3.1

Notation and Setup

We introduce our notation and the general framework used to study the advertiser’s decision problem.
During a given time period (say a day) a keyword k is searched Sk times, where Sk is a random
variable. Sk also represents the total number of impressions, i.e. the number of times the advertiser’s
ad is displayed by the search engine. The expected number of impressions is deﬁned as µk = E[Sk ].
We denote the bid of the advertiser for the keyword as bk , and assume that the advertiser does not
change the bid during the day. Every time the keyphrase is searched, the advertiser’s ad is placed
(s)

at some position in the list of all sponsored results. Let posk be the position at which the ad was
(s)

shown in the sth search, with the topmost position denoted position 0. Let δk

be an indicator

of whether a person who was searching for the keyword clicked on the advertiser’s link, or not:
(
)
(s)
(s)
δk = I clickk .
The advertiser’s value from a click is denoted by an independent random variable wk . We
assume that the precise value from a click is not known a priori but that it’s expected value E[wk ]
(s)

is known and equals Ewk . In Section 5, we discuss how Ewk is estimated from historical data. vk
(s)

(s)

denotes the advertiser’s value from the sth impression. vk = δk wk , i.e. it equals wk if the user
(s)

clicks on the ad or 0 otherwise. Let bk be the advertiser’s cost per click i.e. the bid of the advertiser
(s)

at the next position posk + 1. The cost associated with impression s may then be expressed as
(s)

(s) (s)

ck = δk bk .4 Because consumers do not know the bids placed by advertisers, it seems reasonable
4

The discussion assumes that ads are ordered by bid and that the advertiser pays the bid of the next advertiser.
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to assume that given an ad’s position in the list, the probability that a person clicks on the ad does
(i)

not depend on the bid of the next advertiser. That is, conditional on the position posk , the vector
(
)
(i) (i)
bk , δk has independent components. We also assume that Sk is independent of other variables.
Besides the advertiser, there are Nk other advertisers who place their bids for keyword k. We
assume that Nk is known to the advertiser. It can be observed, for example, by submitting sample
queries to the search engine and observing the number of ads displayed. We note that the number
of competitors may in reality vary a bit from one impression to another due to advertiser budget
constraints, but we do not observe signiﬁcant variation in this to warrant a random treatment for
Nk .5 The bids of the competitors cannot be directly observed because the auction is a sealed bid
auction. The key assumption we make is that the competitors place their bids according to some
distribution Fk (.) and this does not change during the estimation period. The bids of competing
advertisers are based on two factors - their intrinsic valuations for a click and their competitive
responses in the GSP auction. We assume that there is an underlying valuation distribution (for
clicks) which when combined with the advertisers’ bidding strategies gives rise to the bid distribution
Fk (.).6 Finally, D denotes the advertiser’s budget in a given time period of interest. Table 1
summarizes our notation.

3.2

Model Formulation

The advertiser faces the following decision problem:
[
max E
{bk }

Sk
∑∑
k

]
(s)
vk |bk

[
s.t. E

,

s=1

Sk
∑∑
k

]
(s)
ck |bk

≤ D.

(1)

s=1

The objective is to determine bids bk in order to maximize the advertiser’s expected revenues.
The constraint implies that the expected cost should be less than or equal to a budget D. Note
that the budget is not modeled as a hard constraint. This is a common format in which budget
constraint is speciﬁed by advertisers in the SEM industry, and reﬂects an objective function of
A common practice is to use the product of bid and a quality score to rank order the advertisers, and the payment
is the minimum bid needed to secure the position (e.g. the payment per click for an advertiser in position i is
bid(i + 1) ∗ Quality(i + 1)/Quality(i). This does not aﬀect our model. If we normalize the bid of all competitors by
the ratio of their quality score relative to our advertiser (N ormalizedBid = bid∗QualityCompetitor /QualityAdvertiser ),
our analysis can be interpreted as based on this normalized bid.
5
The coeﬃcient of intra-day variation in Nk = 0.031 and the coeﬃcient of inter-day varation in Nk = 0.102. A
model that incorporates the randomness in Nk is available from the authors upon request.
6
The proposed bids might change Fk (.), but for identiﬁcation purposes we assume that this competitive reaction
is minimal in the short-term. Later in the paper, we discuss how the competitive reaction can be factored in by
re-estimating parameters periodically and updating bids.
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k
Sk
µk
(s)
bk
(s)
posk
(s)
δk
wk
Ewk
(s)
vk
(s)
bk
(s)
ck
Nk
Fk (.)
D

Table 1: Summary of notation
Variable that indexes keywords
Random variable denoting number of searches for keyword k
Expected number of search for keyword k (E[Sk ])
Superscript to denote sth search
Bid for keyword k
(s)
Position for keyword k in sth search. posk = 0 denotes the top position.
Indicator variable for click on sth search.
Random variable indicating value of a click
Expected value of a click on keyword k (E[wk ])
(s)
(s)
Value of the sth search (vk = δk wk )
The bid of the next advertiser
(s)
(s) (s)
The cost of the sth search (ck = δk bk )
Number of competitors
Distribution of bids of competitors
Advertiser’s budget

the form max{bk } E

]
(s)
(s)
(v
−
λc
)|b
k . Thus, the objective is to maximize expected proﬁt
s=1 k
k

[∑ ∑
Sk
k

but the shadow price of ad dollars is speciﬁed in the form of a constraint on the expected cost.
The optimization problem in Equation (1) always has a solution as shown in Appendix A1 (All
important proofs appear in the Appendix). Solving the problem gives the following optimality
condition

]
]
[S
[S
k
k
∑
∑
d
d
(s)
(s)
∀k :
E
vk |bk = λ
E
ck |bk .
dbk
dbk
s=1

(2)

s=1

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The optimality condition states that at the optimal bids the
ratio of the marginal change in the advertiser’s expected revenues over the marginal change in
the advertiser’s expected cost should be constant across keywords. An alternative way to interpret it is as follows. If we decrease the bid for keyphrase k ′ by ε, then the expected cost will
∑Sk′ [ (s) ]
decrease by ε dbd ′ E s=1
ck′ |bk′ and, hence, we may increase the bid for another keyphrase k by
k
[
]
∑Sk′ (s)
∑ k [ (s) ]
ck |bk . In this case the expected increase in proﬁts will be
ε dbd ′ E s=1
ck′ |bk′ / dbdk E Ss=1
k

ε

]
(s)
Sk ′ [
Sk ′ [
]
]
vk |bk dbd ′ ∑
∑
d
(s)
(s)
k
[
]
′ − ε
′
E
c
|b
E
v
|b
= 0.
′
′
k
k
∑Sk
k
k
(s)
d
dbk′
s=1
s=1
s=1 ck |bk
dbk E

∑Sk
d
s=1
dbk E

[

We assume that consumer click behavior and competitor bidding behavior is i.i.d across ad impressions during the given time period. Hence, in Expression (2) we may cancel the sums over s.
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Therefore, the optimal vector of bids should satisfy the following condition:
∀k :

3.3

d
d
E [vk |bk ] = λ
E [ck |bk ] .
dbk
dbk

(3)

Optimality Condition

It is hard to use the optimality condition (3) to compute the optimal bids. In order to apply (3),
the advertiser needs to compute E [vk |bk ] and E [ck |bk ] accounting for the uncertainty in competing
bids and consumer query and click behavior. In this section, we express the optimality condition
in terms of parameters that can be estimated. We assume that the number of competitors Nk is
known and is constant during the day. We can identify the number of competitors by performing
a search on keyword k at a search engine.
Consider a speciﬁc keyword k . We tentatively drop the subscript k as we focus on an individual
keyword. In order to compute E [v|b], we need to identify the probability of a click given the bid b,
which in turn depends on the probability distribution of the ad position. Given that the competing
advertisers’ bids are drawn from F (.), the probability of being at position i conditional on a bid b
is




Pr {pos = i|b} = 

N

 (1 − F (b))i F (b)N −i .

(4)

i
The position is determined by a Bernoulli process, where the probability that a competitor bids
more than b and is placed higher is equal to 1 − F (b). Recollect that the positions start from 0,
i.e., the topmost ad has position pos = 0, and position i indicates that there are i other advertisers
ranked above. Feng, Bhargava and Pennock’s (2007) analysis of click-through data suggests that
the probability that a user clicks on an ad in position pos is
Pr {δ = 1|pos = i} =

α
,
γi

(5)

where α and γ are keyword speciﬁc constants. α represents the overall attractiveness of the ad
and γ captures the impact of position on clicks. This functional form does not explicitly consider
a number of other factors, e.g. number of words in the keyword, whether the advertiser appears in
the organic results or not, presence of dominant competitors etc., that might aﬀect CTR (Yao and
Mela, 2011, Agarwal et al., 2011, Katona and Sarvary, 2010, Ghose and Yang, 2009). It focuses only
on the impact of position on CTR because ad position is the primary mechanism through which bid
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impacts CTR. However, the parameter α captures the eﬀect that ad/keyword-level attributes like
the number of words in the keyword etc. have on the overall attractiveness of the ad. γ on the other
hand captures the change in CTR with respect to position, all other factors held constant, which is
consistent with prior research (Katona and Sarvary, 2010, Ghose and Yang, 2009).7 This function
also assumes that consumer behavior is i.i.d and ignores heterogeneity across consumers. We use
this assumption not only for model tractability but also because search engines do not provide
user-level data on impressions and clicks. Several papers that focus on keyword-level models, also
assume i.i.d. consumer behavior (Agarwal et al., 2011, Yang and Ghose, 2010, Ghose and Yang,
2009). Given that the consumers click in the aforementioned manner, the probability of a click
conditional on the bid b is given by
Pr {δ = 1|b} =

∑

Pr {δ = 1|pos = i} Pr {pos = i|b}

(6)

i



∑α
N
 (1 − F (b))i F (b)N −i

=
γi
i
i
= αγ −N (1 + (γ − 1) F (b))N .
Proposition 1: The expected value of an impression is given by
E [v|b] = E [δw|b] = Pr {δ = 1|b} E[w] = αγ −N (1 + (γ − 1) F (b))N Ew.

(7)

It follows from Proposition 1 that
d
E [v|b] = αN γ −N (γ − 1)f (b) (1 + (γ − 1)F (b))N −1 .
db

(8)

We now derive an expression for E [c|b]. In order to do so, we need to characterize the probability
distribution function of the bid of the next advertiser in the list of sponsored results. We ﬁrst derive
some intermediate results.
Lemma 1: The distribution function of the bid of the next advertiser in the list conditional on
7

However, if the presence of a dominant competitor introduces discontinuities in how position aﬀects CTR (e.g.,
CTR depends on whether the advertiser is above or below the dominant competitor), the functional form fails to
capture the same.
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the bid and the position is given by
(
F (b|b, pos = i) =

F (b)
F (b)

)N −i
.

Applying,

(
F (b|b, pos = i, δ = 1) = F (b|b, pos = i) =

(9)

F (b)
F (b)

)N −i
,

(10)

we can derive the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The conditional distribution of the bid of the next advertiser conditional on the bid
and the fact that the ad was clicked is
F (b|b, δ = 1) =

N
∑

F (b|b, δ = 1, pos = i) × Pr {pos = i|b, δ = 1}

i=0

(
=

1 − F (b) + γF (b)
1 + (γ − 1) F (b)

(11)

)N
.

When a user clicks on an ad, the advertiser has to pay the bid of the next advertiser in the list.
Applying Lemma 2 and Equation (6) gives us
Proposition 2: The expected cost of an impression is given by
E [c|b] = E [δb|b]

(12)

= E [b|b, δ = 1] Pr {δ = 1|b}
(
)
ˆ b
−N
N
N
= αγ
b[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)] −
[1 − F (b) + γF (b)] db .
0

Using Proposition 2 we can derive that
dE[c|b]
db

(
= αN γ −N f (b) (γ − 1)b[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N −1 +

ˆ

b

)
[1 − F (b) + γF (b)]N −1 db . (13)

0

Substituting Expressions (8) and (13) in Equation (3),
dE[v|b]
db
1
λ

dE[c|b]
,
db
(
)
´b
N −1 db
1
0 [1 − F (b) + γF (b)]
b+
.
Ew
(γ − 1)[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N −1

= λ
=
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Proposition 3: The optimality condition (expressed in terms of estimable parameters) is
(
)
´ bk
Nk −1 db
[1
−
F
(b
)
+
γ
F
(b)]
1
k k
k k
∀k :
bk + 0
= const.
Ewk
(γk − 1)[1 + (γk − 1)F (bk )]Nk −1

(14)

Proposition 4: A unique bid b∗k satisﬁes the optimality condition (Equation 14) for keyword k
when
]
[
´b
Nk −2 dx
[1
−
F
(b)
+
γ
F
(x)]
1
k
k
k
γk > 1 +
−1 .
fk (b)(Nk − 1) 0
Fk (b)
[1 + (γk − 1)Fk (b)]Nk −2
The optimality condition can be used in conjunction with the budget constraint to compute the
optimal bids. For several common distributions and a wide range of parameters, we show in the
appendix that the conditions for a unique bid (Proposition 4) are satisﬁed. In order to compute
the optimal bids, the following keyword-speciﬁc constants need to be known: αk (the click-through
rate at the top position), γk (rate at which CTR decays with position), Ewk (expected revenue
per-click (RPC)), Nk (number of competing bidders), and Fk (.) (distribution of competing bids).
We estimate these parameters using a real-world dataset and illustrate how bids may be computed
in Section 5. The optimal bids should satisfy equation (14) and the budget constraint,
∑

µk E [ck ] = D.

k

These conditions are suﬃcient to compute bids. The budget constraint can be rewritten as
∑

µk αk γk−Nk

(

ˆ
bk [1 + (γk − 1)Fk (bk )]Nk −

bk

)
[1 − Fk (bk ) + γk Fk (b)]Nk db

= D.

(15)

0

k

For a given const in Equation (15), we compute the bid that satisﬁes the equation for every
keyword. Then we use Equation (15) to calculate the expected total cost for the computed bids. If
the expected cost is lower than D, we increase the constant, otherwise we decrease it. The process
repeats until the expected total cost is suﬃciently close to the budget.
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4

Data Description

Our dataset is from a leading meat distributor that sells through company owned retail stores as
well as online and through mail-order catalogs. This ﬁrm bids on thousands of keywords across
several search engines and has a substantial online presence. Our dataset consists of daily summary
records for 247 keywords that the ﬁrm uses to advertise on Google. These keywords are a part of
the North-East campaign of the advertiser that targets consumers in the northeastern parts of the
Unites States. The daily record for each keyword has the following ﬁelds,
(id,

t,

b,

i,

cl,

avgcpc,

avgpos)

where
id tbicl avgcpc avgpos-

Unique identiﬁer for each keyword
date
bid submitted by advertiser
number of impressions during the day
number of clicks during the day
average cost per click on the day
average position during the day

This dataset is representative of the the type of data available to advertisers in sponsored search.
Advertisers only get summary reports from search engines and do not usually have information on
clicks and position for each individual ad impression. We present the summary statistics at the
keyword-level for a three-month period (March 01-May 31, 2011) prior to the ﬁeld implementation
in Table 2.
The mean average bid across all keywords during this period is $1.18 and the minimum and
maximum average bids for any keyword during this period is 35¢ and $10, respectively. We also
observe that the mean average revenue per-click (RPC) is $4.33 where as the mean average CPC
is 75¢, however there is a huge variation in the proﬁtability across the keywords as indicated by
the large standard deviation in the average RPC. These 247 keywords belong to 29 unique product
categories which span frozen meats, sea foods and desserts. A comprehensive list of these product
categories appears in Table 3. We randomly divided these 29 product categories into three distinct
treatment groups. The random assignment ensures that the product categories in the three groups
14

Avg Bid
Avg CPC
Avg Pos
Impressions
Clicks
CTR
Cost
Revenue
Gross Proﬁt
Avg RPC
Days Shown

Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean
Standard Deviation Minimum
1.18
1.01
0.35
0.73
0.59
0.00
3.15
1.90
1.00
5637.22
13106.39
1.00
48.37
86.76
0.00
0.03
0.07
0.00
45.95
95.11
0.00
83.26
132.47
0.00
37.31
140.78
-747.43
4.33
14.30
0.00
84.72
16.51
54.00

Maximum
10.00
4.42
12.41
98373.00
593.00
0.60
747.43
974.31
902.20
158.96
92.00

are well match as shown in the treatment eﬀect literature (Angelucci and Giorgi, 2009). The bids
for the ﬁrst group continued to be controlled by the ﬁrm. This group forms the control group
for our experiment. The other two groups represent the two treated groups and their bids are
determined by the myopic bidding policy (Group I) outlined in Section 3 and the forward looking
policy (Group II) that we outline in Section 6. The control group is used to account for any time
trends that might enter the analysis due to seasonality in retail, search engine design changes and
other such factors. The three groups are fairly well matched in terms of impressions, clicks, cost
and revenues of their keywords. Summary statistics for the three groups are presented in Table 4.
Table 3: Product Categories
Bacon
Flat Iron
Pork
Beef
Gift Basket
Porterhouse
Beef Jerky
Gifts
Prime Rib
Beef Sirloin
Halibut
Salmon
Burgers
Ham
Shrimp
Catﬁsh
Hot Dogs
Sole
Cheesecake
Lobster
Surf and Turf
Corned Beef
Lobster Bisque Swordﬁsh
Crab
London Broil
Trout
Fillet Mignon Orange Roughy
Our dataset is divided into three distinct periods as shown in Figure 1. The ﬁrst period runs
from March 1-May 31, 2011. This period forms the “before” period for our analysis during which the
bids for these 247 keywords were decided by the ﬁrm (summary statistics for this period is in Table
2). During this period, there were 1.36 million impressions of the ads for the 247 keywords and they
received 11,651 clicks in total. The total weekly cost of these ads was $964 and the weekly gross
15

Table 4: Summary for the three groups of keywords.
Control Group I Group II
Products Categories
8
10
11
Keywords
55
89
103
Impressions
7474.7
5336.1
4335.8
Clicks
66.6
52.2
30.6
Avg Bid
1.32
1.27
1.14
Avg CPC
0.84
0.91
0.74
Avg Pos
3.22
3.60
2.55
CTR
0.03
0.03
0.04
Avg RPC
4.80
5.36
4.35
Avg RPC/Avg CPC
5.72
5.89
5.87

Figure 1: Illustration of the Timeline for the various data collection periods.
revenue generated from these keywords was $1728. We use the data from this period to compute
the expected value per-click (Ew) and the expected daily impressions (µ) for each keyword.
The second period spans July 1-July 31, 2011 which we refer to as the “estimation period” for
our analysis. We ignore the month of June from our analysis as there is a signiﬁcant increase in
online activity during this month due to Father’s Day. The summary statistics for this period is
presented in Table 5. During the estimation period, we submit random bids for the keywords in
Groups I and II. The bids are uniformly drawn from $0.10 × [1, 30] resulting in a minimum bid of
10¢to a maximum bid of $3.00. The upper limit of $3.00 was prescribed by the advertiser. The
bids are drawn weekly which leads to four unique bids per keyword in the estimation period. This
variation in bids leads to a signiﬁcant variation in the ad position. The variation in position causes
changes in the CTR and CPC and helps the identiﬁcation of the parameters of our model. A
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for the Random Bidding Period
Mean
Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Bid
1.01
0.93
0.05
3.00
Avg CPC
0.77
0.58
0.00
2.89
Avg Pos
2.96
1.87
1.00
11.08
Impressions 2100.45
5115.73
1.00
43498.00
Clicks
19.00
35.78
0.00
277.00
CTR
0.03
0.06
0.00
0.50
Cost
18.29
38.51
0.00
278.97
Revenue
23.46
75.65
0.00
586.92
Gross Proﬁt
5.18
67.51
-150.43
541.22
RPC
1.28
4.31
0.00
29.32
comparison of the variation in the position, CTR and CPC in the “before” and “estimation” periods
(at a keyword level) is shown in Table 6. The exact identiﬁcation strategy is discussed in Section
5. We also observe that there is decrease in the proﬁtability of the campaign during this period as
the bids for keywords in Group I and Group II are chosen randomly.
Table 6: Variation in keyword attributes in the “before” and “estimation” periods.
“before” “estimation”
Num. Bids
1.12
4.00
S.D. Pos
0.87
3.19
S.D. CTR
0.01
0.03
S.D. CPC
0.14
0.32
Finally, optimal bids are computed based on estimated parameters and deployed by the ﬁrm
between August 21 and September 21, 2011. Data from the after period is used to assess the
eﬀectiveness of the bidding policies proposed in this paper. In Section 5, we discuss the estimation
of parameters using data from the “estimation period”. Subsequently, we discuss the results from
the ﬁeld implementation of the myopic policy.

5

Empirical Analysis

We now apply our technique to a real-world dataset of clicks and costs for several keywords and
derive the optimal bids for these keywords. We then describe the results from a ﬁeld implementation
of the suggested bids.
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5.1

Estimation Approach

Our data provide daily summary measures (average position, average cost per click, total clicks) but
not the outcome of each individual impression. Given just these daily summary measures, it is hard
to apply regression or Maximum Likelihood Estimation techniques directly on the aggregated data,
hence we use the Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM) approach to estimate these parameters.
Following the idea of the method of moments, we derive analytical expressions for the moments
we observe empirically, namely, the expected position (avgpost ), cost per click (avgcpct ) and clickthrough rate (ctrt = clt /it ) given the bid for each keyword. These moments are as follows:
E [post |bt ] = Nt (1 − F (bt )) ,
(

ˆ
E [bt |bt , δt = 1] =

xd
x<bt

1 − F (bt ) + γF (x)
1 − (1 − γ) F (bt )

(16)
)N t
,

E [δt |bt ] = αγ −Nt (1 − (1 − γ) F (bt ))Nt .

(17)

(18)

The observed moments can be expressed in terms of the analytical moments as follows:
avgpost = E [post |bt ] + ξ1t ,
avgcpct = E [bt |bt , δt = 1] + ξ2t ,
ctrt = E [δt |bt ] + ξ3t ,
where ξ t = (ξ1t , ξ2t , ξ3t )′ are the random shocks. As the dataset contains only daily aggregates, we
cannot directly estimate the distribution function F (.) using nonparametric approaches since we
have very few bids for each keyword. We therefore use a parametric form for F (.), and estimate its
parameters using the ﬁrst moments associated with the position, cost per click and click-through
rate. For the parametric form of the distribution F (.) we choose the Weibull distribution. This
choice is based on two factors. Firstly, the Weibull distribution can take on diverse shapes and
oﬀers a great deal of ﬂexibility. Secondly, an analysis of a secondary dataset of bids submitted to
a search engine for several keywords in the insurance sector (Abhishek et al., 2011) shows that the
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Weibull distribution is reasonably good for modeling the bids.8 Note that we are not assuming that
the distribution of bids for keywords is the same across the two datasets, rather the bids are from
the same family (Weibull) and the parameters can vary across keywords. The Weibull distribution
has the following cumulative distribution function
{ ( ) }
x θ
F (x; θ, λ) = 1 − exp −
.
λ
It is deﬁned by two parameters θ and λ. Therefore, we have four unknown parameters for any
keyword (λ, θ, α, γ) and 3 moment conditions for every unique bid.
The estimates of the parameter β = (α, γ, λ, θ) is given by
β̂ = arg min ξ(β)′ W ξ(β),
β∈B

where ξ(β) is a vector of error between the observed and computed moments for a particular
keyword during the observation period and W is a weighting matrix. The choice of W is critical
as it determines the asymptotic properties of the estimator. Hansen et al. (1996) and Wooldridge
(2001) suggest that the optimal weighting matrix is given by E[ξ(β)′ ξ(β)]−1 . As we do not know
E[ξ(β)′ ξ(β)], an iterative-GMM estimator is used (see Hansen et al., 1996) wherein the weighting
matrix is iteratively re-estimated till it converges.
In order to compute the optimal bids we also need to know Ew, the expected revenue per-click.
The expected revenue per-click is computed by taking the total revenues from the keyword in the
“before” period and dividing it by the total number of clicks for that keyword in the same period.
It should be kept in mind that we only consider sales through the online channel in this analysis.
The advertiser attributes revenues from a purchase to the keyword that generated the session in
which the purchase was made. One drawback with the approach is that it does not account for
indirect beneﬁts such as awareness. As stated above, we address that later in the paper.

5.2

Identification Strategy

The parameters of this model can be estimated if we have at least 2 unique bids per keyword in
the data. However, there are two important reasons why data from the “before” period cannot be
used to estimate the parameters of this model - (i) insuﬃcient variation in bids, and (ii) potential
8

The authors test several distributions such as Normal, Log-Normal, Gamma, Exponential and Logit but the
Weibull distribution ﬁts their data the best. Note however that our framework is ﬂexible enough and other distribution
can be easily accommodated.
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endogeneity in advertiser’s bids.
Limited Variation in Bids
In typical SSA campaigns advertisers change their bids infrequently, sometimes once in several
months. Hence it is diﬃcult to identify the parameters of the model. In our dataset, there are
very few changes in the bids for the keywords and the average number of unique bids per keyword
are 1.12. Because our model is under-identiﬁed with less than two unique bids, we use the period
of random bidding to generate random bids which would lead to suﬃcient variability in the bids
drawn for a particular keyword across days.
Endogeneity of Bids
The second concern with using historical data is the potential endogeneity of bids. In order for
the GMM to provide consistent estimate we require that E[bξ] = 0 or the bids and the random
shock are independent of each other. However, the ﬁrm might increase the bid for a particular
keyword if there is a random increase in demand, e.g. on a sunny weekend. These random shocks
are observed by the advertisers but we as researchers are not aware of them. Since the ﬁrm is
bidding strategically, it is very likely that the bids for a particular keyword are correlated with
these random shock in the before period. We address this endogeneity issue by using random bids
in the estimation period. This randomization of bids ensures that they are independent of the
random shocks.
The random bids in the “estimation” period address the limited variations in bids and the endogeneity of bids. However, we still need to make several parametric assumptions in the model, e.g.
exponential decay of the CTR curve and Weibull distribution for F(.) because there is insuﬃcient
keyword-level data to perform non-parametric estimation. We also require that the distribution
F (.) does not change during the estimation period as competitive response to the random bids
being set during this period. This seems like a reasonable assumption given the muted short-term
competitive response in sponsored search as pointed out by Rutz and Bucklin (2011). We revisit
this assumption in Section 7.2.
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5.3

Estimation Details and Results

In order to estimate the parameters, a nonlinear solver is used in our implementation.9 The
parameter estimates for a few representative keywords are shown in Table 7. N represents the mean
number of daily competitive ads in the observation period. For brevity, we plot the distribution
of the estimated parameters for all keywords in Groups I and II in Figure 2. A complete table is
available from the authors upon request.
Table 7: Parameter estimates for
keyword
λ
θ
beef sirloin steak
1.7651
0.5351
(0.4927) (0.2821)
Steak Burger
0.6697
2.1944
(0.4035) (0.3731)
cheesecakes
0.9736
1.3265
(0.2064) (0.4270)
Porterhouse Steak 1.1413
0.8639
(0.5118) (0.1821)
smoke salmon
1.3414
1.1752
(0.5429) (0.4520)
corned beef
1.5368
0.7492
(0.8126) (0.5781)
hot dog order
1.0769
1.0869
(0.4410) (0.7503)
birthday gifts
1.1756
0.8420
(0.6781) (0.4176)
birthday present
0.7524
1.3841
(0.6721) (0.4816)
lobster bisque
1.311
1.0074
(0.3928) (0.5025)

a sample subset of keywords.
α
γ
N
Ew($)
0.0266
2.1237
9.5
0.00
(0.0115) (0.2742)
0.0069
1.2915
5.1
1.53
(0.0008) (0.0902)
0.0004
1.6091
7.0
1.08
(0.0000) (0.2405)
0.0085
1.1661
4.6
0.43
(0.0015) (0.3711)
0.0073
1.0255 10.1
6.62
(0.0012) (0.3989)
0.0018
1.0175 10.7
3.80
(0.0004) (0.7045)
0.0101
1.6486
7.3
3.00
(0.0036) (0.2446)
0.0009
1.0659 40.2
5.74
(0.0000) (0.7850)
0.0122
1.0434
7.1
0.45
(0.0057) (0.9381)
0.0145
1.9293 11.3
0.00
(0.0037) (0.4117)

Although there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity across keywords, the estimated parameter values are
fairly typical in sponsored search. The mean click-through rate (α) at the topmost position is 0.026
and the mean decay parameter (γ) is 1.68 which is similar to the values reported earlier (Feng et al.,
2006, Craswell et al., 2008). There is also considerable variation in the expected revenue per-click
(Ew) and the bid distributions (λ,θ) across keywords.
9

We use the Fletcher-Xu hybrid method provided as a part of the ClsSolve routine in TOMLAB.
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Figure 2: Distribution of estimated parameters across keywords.

5.4

Field Implementation

Once we estimate parameters α, γ, λ and θ for all keywords, we estimate the optimal bids for these
keywords. In this section we focus on the myopic policy outlined in Section 3 and discuss the results
of the ﬁeld implementation for keywords in Group I.
For the keywords in Group I, we use a daily budget D = $72.00 based on the mean weekly spend
of around $500 during the 3 month “before” period. The bids are recomputed after two weeks when
we re-estimate the parameters (α, γ, λ, θ) using newly available data. The bids are recomputed to
account for changes in competitor bids and consumer click behavior. However, the bids do not
change much during this re-computation. Bids for a sample of keywords are below in Table 8.
The rationale for these bids can be inferred from the parameters listed in Table 7. Consider, for
example, bids for keywords “smoke salmon”, “hot dogs order” and “birthday gifts”. Our algorithm
suggests increasing their bids. From Table 7, we observe that their expected value per click (Ew) is
high and it makes sense that the algorithm is suggesting that we increase their bids. Interestingly,
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Table 8: Parameter estimates for a sample subset of keywords.
keyword
Old Bids ($) New Bids ($)
beef sirloin steak
0.82
0.00
Steak Burger
2.19
0.95
cheesecakes
0.66
0.70
Porterhouse Steak
0.76
0.30
smoke salmon
1.16
2.55
corned beef
0.31
3.00
hot dogs order
0.76
1.85
birthday gifts
0.96
1.75
birthday present
1.61
0.20
lobster bisque
0.46
0.00
the keyword “birthday gifts” has a very high Ew, yet its bid is not raised by a signiﬁcant amount.
This is because the keyword is very expensive (low θ) and it is very diﬃcult to attain the top
position. There are other keywords where it is worthwhile to spend the advertising dollars. This
policy also decreases the bids for keywords like “beef sirloin steak”, “lobster bisque” and “birthday
present”. The bids for “beef sirloin steak” and “lobster bisque” are decreased because they are not
proﬁtable. The bid for “birthday present” is decreased because (i) it is not very proﬁtable and (ii)
it is possible to get a similar number of clicks at a lower position (low γ) for much cheaper.
The suggested bids were deployed in the ﬁeld by the advertiser for a period of 4 weeks. During
the 12 weeks in the “before” period, the ﬁrm spent a total of $5937.58 on the keywords in Group I and
obtained revenues of $9776.10. In the “after” period, the total cost and total revenues associated
with the keywords were $3178.82 and $4594.43 respectively. In the same period, the total cost
(revenues) associated with the control keywords was $4701.52 ($9776.2) and $1667.54 ($1480.80),
respectively. We use a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence approach to compute the eﬀect of our algorithm.
The improvement in performance due to the algorithm is given by
τM

= ∆ROIGroup I − ∆ROIControl
= (44.53% − 64.65%) − (−11.20% − 84.30%)
= 75.38%

The performance of the advertising campaign increases by 75.38% on a DiD basis indicating that
the myopic policy outperforms the advertisers bidding policy. In the next section we discuss some
of the drivers of this performance gain. Surprisingly, we notice that there is an absolute decrease
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in the ROI in the campaign compared to the “before” time period and this decrease is particularly
notable for the Control group. This is partly because of seasonality in meat sales. In addition, there
were changes in the manner in which the search engine displayed search results. From July onwards,
the search engine started highlighting the top ads by using a light pink background color, which
resulted in an increase in the CTR of the top ads.

10

For the Control group we see an increase in

the CTR from 0.89% to 1.4% even though there was no apparent change in the advertiser’s bidding
policy and for the keywords in Group II we see a change from 1.04% to 1.15%. We observed
that this not only resulted in an increased CTR for the keywords, but also a decrease in their
performance during this time. This change negatively aﬀects the performance of our policy as some
the underlying parameters that were used to compute the optimal bids have changed. However, the
control group allows us to control for such changes in the search engine policy. Since the keywords
in the Control Group and Group I are matched as a result of the randomization procedure, the
change in the display scheme has the same eﬀect (on average) on the keywords in both groups.
Hence, the DiD approach eliminates the inﬂuence of the policy change and any other changes in
the environment and measures the diﬀerence in performance between the myopic policy and the
policy adopted by our partner advertiser. It should also be noted that, although the parameters of
the model are recomputed during the experiment, the estimates did not reﬂect the changes in the
CTR model. Since the data during the ﬁeld experiment (1.5 week) were pooled with data from the
estimation period (4 weeks), the changes during the experiment did not have a signiﬁcant impact
on the parameter estimates.

5.5

Analysis of the Field Experiment

In the previous section we presented the improvement that the myopic policy oﬀers over the advertiser’s policy. In this section, we discuss in further detail the factors that lead to the improvement
in the campaign’s performance. There are two main sources of improvement – Firstly, a comprehensive model that captures the eﬀect of bid on position, position on CTR and eventually the bid on
the value (vk ) and cost (ck ), helps us in improving the bids for each keywords. Secondly, since bids
for the entire portfolio are determined jointly, the advertising budget can be distributed from less
proﬁtable keywords to relatively more proﬁtable keywords (based on the aforementioned model).
As both these approaches are concurrently applied to the portfolio, it is diﬃcult to disentangle the
10

Several analysts suggest that the pink background for the ads is indistinguishable from the page background and
users mistake these ads for organic links.
http://www.plymarketing.com/ppc/6-reasons-googles-new-ad-layout-should-really-piss-you-oﬀ/

24

eﬀect of these drivers on the campaign performance. However, we can demonstrate how both these
decisions aﬀect the bids and proﬁtability of keywords in the campaign. The following table contains
a list of sample keywords and their performance during the ﬁeld experiment. For each keyword,
the table reports the average revenue per click (RPC), original bid, new bid, average cost per click
(CPC) and the percentage change in gross proﬁts under the new bid.

keyword
buy orange roughy
ﬁlet mignon
buy lobster online
smoked salmon lox
bbq Beef
lobster delivery
precooked bacon
birthday gifts

Table 9: Changes in keyword performance
Avg RPC($) Old bids($) New bids($) Avg CPC
2.95
0.35
0.85
0.29
5.00
1.50
2.55
1.83
3.92
1.91
2.35
1.86
5.85
1.00
3.00
2.03
3.83
1.52
1.00
0.96
1.62
2.25
0.95
0.87
1.57
1.50
1.05
0.68
5.74
0.96
1.75
1.73

∆Gross Proﬁt
343.33
210.37
148.19
38.24
42.56
-1.310
-38.73
-204.92

From the sample presented in Table 9 we observe that the advertiser was initially placing low bids
for keywords like “buy orange roughy” and “ﬁlet mignon” . These keywords are in fact very proﬁtable
(have a high RPC and a low CPC) as they do not face intense competition. Using the analytical
model presented in Section 3, we can ascertain not only the consumer response parameter (CTR v/s
position) but also the competitive landscape associated with a keyword, which are subsequently
incorporated in the bidding process. E.g. since there is very little competition for “buy orange
roughy”, the myopic policy recommends increasing the bid for this keyword. Even though the bid
has been increased signiﬁcantly, the CPC in the “after” period is considerably low (29¢), which
further validates the low level of competition for this keyword. Interestingly, the policy reduces the
bid for “bbq Beef”. This is because the decay in the CTR with position is very low for this keyword
(γ = 1.0338). Hence a lower bid can decrease the costs without aﬀecting the revenues considerably.
This complex interaction between the bid, the revenue and the cost associated with a keyword
cannot be predicted in a modeless manner. Our approach explicitly captures the relationship
between these variable and hence outperforms the original heuristics adopted by our advertiser.
We also observe that the bids for several moderately proﬁtable keywords like “lobster delivery”
and “precooked bacon” have been reduced in the after period. These keywords were proﬁtable but
the optimization reduces the bids for these keywords because of the budget constraint. A portion of
the budget invested in these keywords can be diverted to other keywords that deliver higher proﬁts.
Consequently, their bids are lowered and they generate lower revenue and, interestingly, lower gross
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proﬁts during the ﬁeld experiment as compared to the “before” period. It should be noted that
this decrease in proﬁts is more than oﬀset by the investment in relatively more proﬁtable keywords.
In summary, the myopic policy focuses on relatively cheap and proﬁtable keywords and reduces
the bids of other keywords to maximize the proﬁts from these keywords. Surprisingly, we see that
the gross proﬁts for “birthday gifts”, a high performing keyword in the “before” period, decrease
considerably during the ﬁeld experiment despite the increase in bid. The myopic policy increases
the bid for “birthday gifts” given its high RPC. However, as the CTR increased signiﬁcantly during
the ﬁeld experiment (due to the changes by the search engine), the value per impression vk dropped
considerably and this keyword incurred a loss.

6

Incorporating Interdependence between Keywords

The preceding discussion assumes that keywords are independent of each other and the consumer
click behavior is i.i.d.. In reality, consumers may search across several keywords before making a
purchase decision and this might lead to interaction between keywords. For example, a consumer
might begin his search with a generic keyword like “ﬁllet mignon” but may eventually purchase
using another keyword such as “Walmart ﬁllet mignon”. While searching for ﬁllet mignon, he
could have been exposed to ads from Walmart, causing Walmart to be part of his consideration
set. Not accounting for such spillovers may cause the advertiser to undervalue “ﬁllet mignon” and
overvalue “Walmart ﬁllet mignon”. This example illustrates that there is value in accounting for
these interactions while making bidding decisions. One way to capture this interaction is a full
factorial design, where we consider spillovers for every possible subset of the portfolio of keywords
and decide the optimal bids for keywords in this subset. However, the problem is NP hard and
requires signiﬁcant resources to assess the performance of each subset. In this paper we will focus
on a speciﬁc kind of interaction proposed by Rutz and Bucklin (2011). We categorize the keywords
into two groups – generic and branded – and explore how these two groups of keywords interact.
A generic keyword does not contain the brand name of the ﬁrm (e.g. “ﬁllet mignon”) whereas
a branded keyword does (e.g. “Walmart ﬁllet mignon”). Advertising on generic keywords can help
create awareness about the brand/product which can then increase the likelihood that the brand is a
part of the consumer’s consideration set and, in turn, result in greater number of branded searches.
Rutz and Bucklin (2011) show that there are considerable spillovers from generic to branded search
activity in sponsored search. Methods which do not account for awareness might undervalue some
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keywords. E.g., in our dataset, clicks on generic keywords are usually more expensive than on
branded keywords (e.g., $0.88 v/s $0.45) and less proﬁtable (e.g., $2.89 v/s $7.80). If we just
look at the RPC and CPC of the keywords, it is more proﬁtable to invest in branded keywords
as compared to generic keywords. However, as pointed out earlier, bidding on expensive generic
keywords might lead to future branded search and more clicks on the proﬁtable branded keywords.
Hence, the advertiser should incorporate this spillover eﬀect while making his bidding decisions. In
the following discussion we present a model that accounts for this dynamic interaction between the
generic and branded keywords while computing optimal bids.

6.1

Measuring Interactions

In order to incorporate the spillover eﬀect in our decision model we ﬁrst need to estimate the
changes in awareness due to search activity and its eﬀect on future search activity. We use the
Nerlove-Arrow model (Rutz and Bucklin, 2011, Naik and Sawyer, 1998, Nerlove and Arrow, 1962)
to capture the evolution of awareness
dAt
= −(1 − η A )At + βX t ,
dt

(19)

where At refers to the awareness level at time t, (1−η A ) measures the decay of awareness with time,
X t is a vector of covariates that capture the search activity at time t and β captures the extent
to which diﬀerent kinds of search activity aﬀect the level of awareness. According to the NerloveArrow model, brand awareness decays over time since consumers forget about a brand as time goes
by. Search activity, on the other hand, reinforces brand awareness. This increased awareness, in
turn, can lead to further branded search activity. We divide the keywords into two groups – G
(generic) and B (branded) – and explore how search activity related to these keywords aﬀects the
level of awareness. The two search activities that we observe in our dataset are impressions and
clicks for each keyword in the campaign. Prior results suggest that ad impressions do not have
a signiﬁcant impact on brand awareness but clicks on ads increase brand awareness (Rutz and
Bucklin, 2011). This is because an ad impression does not guarantee that the ad is seen by the
consumer and, further, mere exposure to an ad may not have an impact on the consumer unless
the consumer pays suﬃcient attention to the ad (e.g., by clicking it). We incorporate this ﬁnding
in our model and assume that generic and branded clicks may increase brand awareness (which is
latent in our model and cannot be directly observed). An increase in this latent awareness can lead
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to more search and hence more generic or branded impressions.11 This interaction is demonstrated
in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Interaction between search activity and latent awareness.
We ﬁrst describe how generic and branded clicks aﬀect awareness. The total number of generic
∑
∑
B
and branded clicks at time t are deﬁned as CLK G
t =
k∈G clk,t and CLK t =
k∈B clk,t , respectively. As we only observe daily data, we use a discrete time analogue of the model presented in
Equation (19),
At+1 = ηA At + βG CLKtG + βB CLKtB + εA
t+1 ,

(20)

where ηA captures the carry-over rate of awareness and εA
t+1 is the idiosyncratic error term. Like
Rutz and Bucklin (2010), we assume that the awareness at time t+1 is aﬀected by the generic search
activity at time t but in addition we allow for branded search activity to also impact awareness. As
highlighted earlier, awareness is not observed in the data and is latent in this state-space model.
Next, we outline how awareness aﬀects both generic and branded search activity. In our model, we
assume that awareness only aﬀects the consumer’s propensity to search but it has no eﬀect on the
consumer behavior after the search is executed. This implies that awareness aﬀects the number of
impressions (queries) but has no impact on the click-through or conversion rates. This assumption
is in keeping with the ﬁndings of Rutz and Bucklin (2011) who show that awareness does not
have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on click − through and conversion rates. The expected
∑
number of generic impressions at time t is deﬁned as µG
t =
k∈G µk,t and the expected number of
∑
branded impressions at time t is deﬁned as µB
t =
k∈B µk,t , where µk,t are the expected number
of impressions for keyword k at time t. The expected number of generic and branded impressions
11

We validate this assumption in our dataset by performing a Granger causality test and infer that impressions
(both generic and branded) do not lead to more clicks but generic clicks lead to more branded impressions.
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evolve with awareness in the following manner,
G
G
G
µG
t+1 = ηG µt + γ At+1 + εt+1 ,

(21)

B
B
B
µB
t+1 = ηB µt + γ At+1 + εt+1 .

(22)

It should be noted that the eﬀect of awareness is computed from aggregate data (not individually
for each pair of generic/branded keyword).12 In order to have a parsimonious model we assume
that the eﬀect of awareness is homogeneous across all branded keywords. Similarly, the eﬀect across
generic keywords is homogeneous.
Combining Equations (20)-(22), we get a state space model whose evolution is as follows
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(23)

where the correlated error terms ε...
t+1 account for random shocks and ε ∼ N (0, Vε ). The following
equation represents how these latent states are linked to the observations,
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G and IM P B are generic and branded impressions at time t+1, ν ... ∼ N (0, V ) is the
where IM Pt+1
ν
t+1
t+1

random shock. We estimate this system of equations using a Dynamic Linear Model (DLM). DLMs
have been used in several situations where an important component of the model is unobserved
(Rutz and Bucklin, 2011, Bass et al., 2007, Naik and Sawyer, 1998). We estimate this model
using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach as proposed by West and Harrison (1997).
Details of the estimation procedure are outlined in Appendix A3. The variation in the number
of impressions and clicks for generic and branded keywords help us identify the parameters of the
model. The estimated parameters of the model are presented in Table 10.
First, we note that there is a strong positive impact of generic clicks on awareness (βG > 0).
Second, increased awareness leads to increased branded search activity (γB > 0). Combining these
12

One can conduct this analysis at a generic-branded keyword-pair level or a product level if there is suﬃcient data
and variation in that data. Our dataset is very sparse to get statistical signiﬁcance at keyword-pair or product level.
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Table 10: Estimated Parameters
Parameter Mean 95% Conf. Interval
ηG
0.9515
[0.9735, 0.9321]
ηB
0.8664
[0.8411, 0.8842]
ηA
0.2418
[0.2297, 0.2547]
γG
0.0232
[-0.0006, 0.0427]
γB
0.1088
[0.0997, 0.1132]
βG
3.4018
[3.2656, 3.6123]
βB
0.0208
[-0.0105, 0.0461]
The ﬁgures in bold are statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level.
results, we conclude that every click on a generic ad increases the number of branded impressions
by γB βG (= 0.38). We also observe that the eﬀects of branded clicks on awareness and of awareness
on generic search activity are insigniﬁcant (βB ≈ 0, γG ≈ 0). These ﬁndings are consistent with the
results reported by Rutz and Bucklin (2011). It appears reasonable that if a consumer is already
aware of a brand, then clicking on a branded ad is less likely to change his awareness about that
brand. Similarly, awareness about a particular brand does not aﬀect consumer’s generic search
behavior.
We incorporate these estimates of spillovers into our decision theoretic model in the following manner. Given the statistically insigniﬁcant estimates of βB and γG , we assume that only
generic clicks aﬀect future search behavior and this eﬀect is limited to branded searches. We also
assume that all generic clicks are identical and lead to the same relative increase in the search (or
impressions) for these branded keywords. More formally,
µk,t+1 = ηB µk,t + γk,B βG CLKG,t
µk,t+1 = ηG µk,t

∀ k ∈ B,

(24)

∀ k ∈ G.

µ

k,t
where γk,B = γB µG,t
is the increase in the expected impressions of keyword k ∈ B at time period

t + 1 for every generic click at time t. The increased impressions for branded keywords, which are
usually more proﬁtable, leads to higher revenues in future periods.

6.2

Forward-Looking Policy

As discussed in the previous section, bidding on keywords has two eﬀects - current period revenues
and future awareness. As a result, the advertiser faces a trade-oﬀ between maximizing current
period revenues and increasing awareness (through more generic clicks) to increase revenues in the
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future. We consider the advertiser’s problem of deciding the bids for the keywords in each time
period so as to maximize the total proﬁts for a ﬁnite time horizon. Lets denote the planning horizon
by T . We assume that the budget in each time period should be less than or equal to D. The
multi-period bidding problem is as follows
T
∑
∑
max
r(µ̄t , b̄t ) s.t.
µk,t ck (bk,t ) ≤ D, t = 1, . . . , T
{b̄t } t=1
k

where µ̄t = (µ1,t , . . . µK,t )T is a vector of the expected number of impressions and b̄t is a vector
of bids for each keyword in period t. r(µ̄t , b̄t ), the expected current period proﬁt, is computed
using the formula in Equation (1). For ease of exposition, we deﬁne the ad spend in time period t
∑
as C(µ̄t , b̄t ) = k µk,t ck (bk,t ). We formulate a ﬁnite horizon dynamic program with T periods to
solve this problem.
T
∑
V (1, µ̄1 ) = max
r(µ̄t , b̄t ) s.t. C(µ̄t , b̄t ) ≤ D, t = 1, . . . , T,
{b̄t } t=1
{
(
)}
T
∑
=
max
r(µ̄1 , b̄1 ) +
max
r(µ̄t , b̄t )
,
b̄1 s.t. C(µ̄1 ,b̄1 )≤D
{b̄t s.t. C(µ̄t ,b̄t )≤D} t=2
{
}
=
max
r(µ̄1 , b̄1 ) + E[V (2, µ̄2 )] ,
b̄1 s.t. C(µ̄1 ,b̄1 )≤D

where V (t, µ̄t ) is the value function at time t. More generally, the Bellman equation for this problem
is as follows
V (t, µ̄t ) =

max
b̄t s.t. C(µ̄t ,b̄t )≤D

{

}
r(µ̄t , b̄t ) + E[V (t + 1, µ̄t+1 )] .

µ̄, the vectors of mean impressions, constitute the state-space and the bids, b̄, are the control
variable. The state evolves in a manner shown earlier in Equation (24). As this is a ﬁnite horizon
problem, we use backward induction to solve for the optimal bids. At t = T , the advertiser
does not care about awareness and the optimal policy in the last stage is to bid according to
the “myopic” policy. In order to ﬁnd the optimal bids for t < T , we use approximate dynamic
programming. We assume that the expected number of generic clicks at time t belongs to the set
CLK = {0, 1, . . . , M }, where M is an arbitrarily large number.13 For every CLK ∈ {0, 1, . . . , M },
we evaluate the subsequent state and optimal revenues in period t + 1. We now solve the problem
in Equation (1) with the additional constraint that there are exactly CLK generic clicks in period
13

M = 200 in our analysis.
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t. This problem is stated as follows
max
{bt }

∑

µk,t E [vk,t |bk,t ]

s.t. C(µ̄t , b̄t ) ≤ D and

k

∑

µk,t E [δk,t |bk,t ] = CLK.

k∈G

The optimal policy in this period is to choose a CLK (and the associated bids, b̄t ) that maximize
the sum of current reward and the optimal future rewards. For the ﬁeld experiment, we update
bids once every two weeks and there are T = 2 time periods in total. The optimal bids under this
forward-looking policy for some keywords are shown in Table 11 below. We also present the bids
that would have been placed if we had used a myopic bidding policy instead. The forward-looking
policy increases the bids for some of the generic keywords if they are likely to generate clicks.
Accordingly, the bids for some of the less proﬁtable branded keywords are reduced.
Table 11: Bids under the forward-looking policy
Keyword
Ew($) Myopic Bids Forward-Looking Bids
buy barbecue
1.94
0.65
0.85
porterhouse steaks
5.50
2.30
2.40
lobster bisque
0.00
0.00
0.20
Nebraska beef
2.69
1.25
1.25
purchase hot dog
4.47
2.45
2.65
buy top sirloins online
0.00
0.00
0.05
trout ﬁllets
0.00
0.00
0.00
beef sirloin online
0.00
0.00
0.00
BRAND-NAME lobster bisque
6.43
2.45
2.15
BRAND-NAME steak burgers
14.59
3.00
3.00

6.3

Field Implementation

We apply the forward-looking policy to keywords in Group II. A daily budget D = $35.00 is used
based on the mean weekly spending of $250 during the 3 month “before” period. We consider two
time periods in our forward looking policy and compute the bids accordingly. The bids computed
for the ﬁrst period are deployed in the ﬁeld for a period of 2 weeks and the bids computed for the
second (last) period are deployed for two weeks thereafter.
During the 12 weeks in the “before” period, the advertiser incurred a cost of $3052.60 and
earned revenues of $5646.03 for Group II keywords. In the “after” period the cost and revenues
were $1201.67 and $2075.43, respectively. Using the Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence approach, as in Section
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5.4, the improvement in performance is estimated to be
τF L = ∆ROIGroup II − ∆ROIControl
= (72.71% − 84.96%) − (−11.20% − 84.30%)
= 83.25%
There is a notable increase in the performance of Group II keywords relative to the control group.
Further, the forward-looking policy provides performance gains over and above that delivered by
the myopic policy (τF L − τM = 7.87%). The eﬀectiveness of the forward-looking policy is likely
to depend on prior brand awareness among search engine users and also on the duration of the
experiment. Thus, the gains may vary in other settings based on prior brand awareness. We expect
that the gains from the forward-looking policy will be greater if the ﬁeld experiment is conducted
over a longer duration. We were unable to experiment for an extended period of time due to
limitations imposed by our partner advertiser.

7

Discussion

In this section, we contrast our proposed approach with policies commonly used by advertisers
in sponsored search. Then we shall discuss some limitations of our models which might limit the
applicability of our bidding policies.

7.1

Contrast with Commonly Used Strategies

Our agreement with the advertiser precludes sharing their exact bidding strategy. However, their
strategy is fairly typical of strategies used by most advertisers in sponsored search. There are
three main reasons why our policies perform better than the policies adopted by these advertisers.
Firstly, because of the complexity of bid determination, most advertisers use simple heuristics to
determine bids. One common heuristic is to simply raise bids for keywords that generate purchases
at a relatively low cost and to reduce bids for keywords that do not generate purchases. While this
is a reasonable heuristic, it does not account for details of the bid distribution or how the CTR
decays with position. For e.g., for some keywords, reducing bids may reduce clicks signiﬁcantly but
it may not have a signiﬁcant impact on cost-per-click. Parameters tied to competing bids and click
decay have a signiﬁcant impact on optimal bids. As shown in Table 8 it might not be optimal to
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invest heavily in a proﬁtable but highly competitive keyword (birthday present). Another challenge
for advertisers is that they often manage bids for keywords individually without optimizing the
portfolio as a whole. Raising and lowering bids for keywords in equal increments to manage the
budget constraint is suboptimal. Optimizing the bids over the entire portfolio helps to move the
advertising dollars from poorly performing keywords to proﬁtable ones in the right increments.
Thirdly, the forward-looking policy accounts for the two-fold eﬀect that sponsored search ads have
- awareness and proﬁts. By ignoring the awareness beneﬁts of generic keywords, advertisers often
under-invest in generic keywords and over-invest in branded keywords.

7.2

Competitive Reaction

This paper adopts a decision-theoretic perspective of the bid problem as opposed to an equilibrium
perspective. Advertisers have to submit bids based on their current beliefs and may choose to
update these bids as their beliefs evolve. Our framework accommodates that by assuming that advertisers can use new data to re-estimate the model parameters and update their bids. If competing
advertisers respond instantaneously to changes in bids then this may reduce the eﬀectiveness of our
bidding policies or at the very least suggest that bids need to be rapidly and continuously updated.
However, current research suggests that competition in sponsored search advertising is fairly subdued (Rutz and Bucklin 2010, Steenkamp et. al. 2005). Our discussions with several managers
indicates that bids for these keywords are rarely updated continuously. This is also reﬂected in our
dataset where bids for less than 10% of the keywords were changed in the 12 week “before” period
when the advertiser was deciding the bids.
To test whether rapid reaction by competitors render our computed bids ineﬀective, we compare
the diﬀerence between the predicted and observed average (i) position and (ii) cost per-click in
the after period (presented earlier in Equations (16) and (18)). If competitors react soon to our
advertiser’s new bids, it would introduce notable errors in our predictions regarding the expected
position and cost-per-clicks. For most of the keywords, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the predicted moments and the daily summaries reported by the search engine, which indicates
that there is no signiﬁcant short-term competitive reaction.14 There can however be long-term
competitive reaction and the model parameters (λ, θ, α, γ) can be periodically re-estimated and
the bids updated to account for these changes. This estimation would not suﬀer from endogeneity
14

The Mean Absolute Error (MAE) of these moments averaged across all keywords are shown in Table 12 in
Appendix A2.
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issues as long as the bids are determined through the proposed algorithm and are uncorrelated with
random shocks. Since the issue of endogeneity no longer arises, there might not be a need for a
random bidding period.

7.3

Spillover across Groups

While computing the eﬀectiveness of the “forward-looking” bidding policy in Section 6, we implicitly
assumed that there are no spillovers across groups. However, spillovers from keywords in one
treatment group into keywords in another group might inﬂuence the estimate of τF L . To control
for this, we divide keywords into product categories and assign all keywords from a product category
into the same treatment group. This experimental design is motivated by the intuition that clicks
on keywords related to a particular product will not have any impact on the search behavior for
other products, e.g. while clicks for “hot dogs” can spill over to branded keywords within the
same product category “BRAND-NAME hot dog”, it will have insigniﬁcant impact on searches for
“salmon” or “BRAND-NAME salmon” . This procedure of random assignment by product categories
helps ensure such that most of the spillovers are within treatment groups. This experimental design
is based on Angelucci and Giorgi (2009) where they propose a methodology to measure treatment
eﬀects with spillovers. Note that the random assignment of the product categories to groups also
ensures that even if there are some spillovers across groups, these eﬀects are similar between any
given pair of groups. A more sophisticated way to incorporate the spillover eﬀect might be a multitier design as proposed by McConnell, Sinclair and Green (2010) but this approach would severely
aﬀect the analytical tractability of our approach and has been left as a direction for future research.

7.4

Multi-Channel Retail

In this paper, we assume that the sponsored ads only aﬀects online revenues. The campaign
considered for this analysis was restricted to the northeast region where the advertiser has very
few brick-and-mortar stores. In addition, the demographics of consumers who visit the advertiser’s
website are very diﬀerent from consumers who buy their products from the oﬄine stores. Hence,
interactions between channels are not a major concern in the current empirical context. However
in a more general situation, there can be interactions between online advertising and oﬄine sales,
and Lewis and Reiley (2011) show evidence of online sales positively aﬀecting oﬄine sales. The
eﬀectiveness of our techniques would improve with better attribution of revenues to their source.
Our approach in this paper ignores multi-channel issues and more sophisticated approaches will
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prove useful. Only accounting for online sales might lead to an underestimation of Ew. However,
given the randomization procedure we employed, we expect no systematic diﬀerences in the extent
of underestimation between the two groups. This would imply that performance gains we observe
in the “after” period for both Groups I and II are underestimated and once the oﬄine revenues are
taken into account, the magnitude improvements can be even higher.

8

Conclusions

The presence of a large portfolio of keywords, multiple slots for each keyword and signiﬁcant
uncertainty in the decision environment make an advertiser’s problem of bidding in sponsored
search a challenging optimization problem. In this paper, we formulated the advertiser’s decision
problem and analytically derived the optimality condition. Our bid optimization model addresses a
major gap in prior work related to incorporating multiple slots per item, uncertainty in competitor
bidding behavior and consumer query and click behavior. We illustrated the technique using a
real-world dataset. A ﬁeld test suggests that the approach can substantially boost advertiser’s RoI.
We extend our basic model to account for secondary eﬀect of these ads - awareness - and show that
incorporating awareness into a multi-period bidding problem can help increase revenues further.
There are a number of interesting avenues along which our work can be extended. We discuss
these below.
Exploration and Learning: Our analysis assumes that keyword-speciﬁc parameters are known or
can be easily estimated based on recent historical data. If there has been suﬃcient bid exploration
in the recent history, these parameters can be estimated as demonstrated in our empirical study.
However, new keywords and keywords for which bids have settled down into a relatively narrow
range present a challenge. Thus an important area of opportunity to further extend our work is to
combine optimization with a suitable exploration technique. Exploration is clearly expensive but
facilitates more accurate estimation of parameters. Heuristics proposed for Multi-armed Bandit
and budget constrained Multi-armed Bandit problems are particularly relevant for balancing exploration and exploitation.
Modeling Advertiser Heterogeneity: The key assumption we make in this paper is that competitor bids are drawn from the same distribution. This allows us to keep the model tractable and
solve the complex stochastic optimization problem faced by an advertiser but ignores heterogeneity
among competitors. Modeling heterogeneity in advertisers’ bidding policies is an important next
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step for our research. Additionally, our focus in this paper, like that of the stream of work on
optimal bidding, is the operational bid determination problem faced by an advertiser at any given
instant rather than an economic analysis of the long-term equilibrium that results from the bidding
strategies of advertisers in a market. Equilibrium analysis is another interesting direction, albeit a
complex one in this setting due to the presence of multiple keywords and a budget constraint.
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Appendix
Proofs of Equations and Propositions
Solution of Equation (1)
The constrained optimization problem is as follows
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Assuming vk , ck are i.i.d., the optimality condition reduces to
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Proof of Lemma 1
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The probability that the bid of the next advertiser is less than x for some x < b conditional on the
bid b and the position i is equal to the probability that exactly i advertisers bid more than b and
exactly N − i advertisers bid less than x divided by the probability that the position is i. That is,
F (b = x|b, pos = i)
= Pr {b < x|b, pos = i} ,
Pr {b < x, pos = i|b}
=
,
Pr {pos = i|b}


N

 (1 − F (b))i F (x)N −i
i

,
= 
N

 (1 − F (b))i F (b)N −i
i
=

F (x)N −i
F (b)N −i

.

Proof of Lemma 2
F (b = x|b, δ = 1)
= Pr {b < x|b, δ = 1} ,
=

N
∑

Pr {b < x|b, δ = 1, pos = i} ×

i=0

Pr {pos = i|b, δ = 1} ,
=

N
∑

F (x|b, pos = i) ×

i=0

Pr {δ = 1|b, pos = i} Pr {pos = i|b}
,
Pr {δ = 1|b}
)
N (
∑
F (x) N −i
=
×
F (b)
i=0


N
α 
 (1 − F (b))i F (b)N −i
γi
i
,
αγ −N (1 + (γ − 1) F (b))N


N
∑
N
(1 − F (b))i

 (γF (x))N −i
=
,
(1 + (γ − 1) F (b))N
i
i=0
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=

(1 − F (b) + γF (x))N
(1 + (γ − 1) F (b))N

.

Proof of Proposition 2
E [c|b] = E [δb|b] ,
= Pr {δ = 1|b} E [b|b, δ = 1] ,
)
ˆ b (
1 − F (b) + γF (b) N
= αγ −N [1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N
bd
,
1 + (γ − 1) F (b)
0
ˆ b
= αγ −N
bd[1 − F (b) + γF (b)]N ,
0
)
(
ˆ b
N
−N
N
= αγ
b[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)] −
[1 − F (b) + γF (b)] db . (Integrating by parts)
0

Proof of Equation 13
dE[c|b]
db

(
= αγ −N [1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N + N (γ − 1)bf (b)[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N −1
ˆ b
)
N
[1 − F (b) + γF (x)]N −1 dx ,
−[1 − F (b) + γF (b)] .1 + N f (b)
0
ˆ b
(
)
= αN γ −N f (b) (γ − 1)b[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N −1 +
[1 − F (b) + γF (x)]N −1 dx .
0

Proof of Proposition 4
´b
Let hN (b) = 0 [1 − F (b) + γF (x)]N dx, gN (b) = [1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N and Ψ(b) = b + hN −1 (b)/((γ −
1)gN −1 (b)). If Ψ(b) is monotonically increasing then there is a unique b∗ that satisﬁes the optimality
condition (Equation 14).
hN −1 (b)
(γ − 1)gN −1 (b)
′
hN −1 (b)gN
h′N −1 (b)
−1 (b)
−
Ψ′ (b) = 1 +
,
2
(γ − 1)gN −1 (b)
(γ − 1)gN −1 (b)
Ψ(b) = b +

=

′
gN −1 (b)[(γ − 1)gN −1 (b) + h′N −1 (b)] − hN −1 (b)gN
−1 (b)
.
2
(γ − 1)gN −1 (b)

′
Ψ′ (b) > 0 if gN −1 (b)[(γ − 1)gN −1 (b) + h′N −1 (b)] − hN −1 (b)gN
−1 (b) > 0, or

γ[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)] > (N − 1)f (b) ×
[
]
´b
´b
N −1 dx
N −2 dx
[1
−
F
(b)
+
γF
(x)]
[1
−
F
(b)
+
γF
(x)]
(γ − 1) 0
+ 0
,
[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N −1
[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N −2
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Figure 4: hN (b)/gN (b) v/s b assuming the competitors bids are Weibull(λ = 1.59, θ = 1.37, γ =
1.42). The ratio hN (b)/gN (b) decreases as N increases.
[

]
hN −1 (b) hN −2 (b)
= (N − 1)f (b) (γ − 1)
+
.
gN −1 (b)
gN −2 (b)
We can show that the ratio hN (b)/gN (b) is decreasing in N implying hN −2 (b)/gN −2 (b) ≥
hN −1 (b)/gN −1 (b) for all N ≥ 2. This intuition is illustrated in Figure (4) for a sample distribution. It can be seen that hN (b)/gN (b) decreases as N is increased.
This implies that Ψ′ (b) > 0 if (write substituting )
hN −2 (b)
γ[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)] > γf (b)(N − 1)
,
gN −2 (b)
[
]
1
hN −2 (b)
or γ > 1 +
f (b)(N − 1)
−1
F (b)
gN −2 (b)
If the rate of decay of the ctr with respect to position (γ) is high enough, then there exists a
unique b∗ that satisﬁes the optimality condition. For some common distributions like the Weibull,
Gamma and Log-Normal we numerically ﬁnd that Ψ(b) is always increasing in b and there exists a
unique bid for every keyword k that satisﬁes the optimality condition. This is illustrated in Figure
(5) for some sample parameters.
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F = Weibull, (λ=2.05, θ=0.68, N=23, γ=2.14)

F = Weibull, (λ=1.59, θ=1.37, N=19, γ=1.42)
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F = Gamma, (k=2, θ=0.5, N=15, γ=1.5)

F = LogNormal, (µ=0.25, σ=0.5, N=10, γ=1.5)
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Figure 5: Ψ(b) for various distributions.

Measuring Competitive Reaction
If there is competitive reaction then the predicted average position and CPC would be considerably
diﬀerent from the observed position or CPC as the competitors might change their bids as a response
to the changes in bids by the advertiser. If the predicted and observed moments of these quantities
are not very diﬀerent, it suggests that the competitive reaction is subdued. In order to measure
competitive reaction, we compute the diﬀerence between the predicted daily average position and
cpc and the mean of these quantities. The MAE is reported in the table below.
Table 12: MAE between the predicted and observed moments
Quantity MAE
position
0.141
cpc
$0.064
Given that these observed quantities are very close to the predicted values, this provides evidence
to suggest that there is very weak competitive reaction during the experimental phase.
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Appendix A3: Estimation of DLM parameters
This appendix provides an overview of the sampling procedure used to estimate parameters of
the Dynamic Linear Model mentioned in Section 6.1. The sampling procedure mentioned here is
an application of the method proposed by West and Harrison (1997). We need to estimate the
parameters of the transition matrix (ηA ,ηB ,ηG , γG ,γB ), the eﬀect of generic and branded clicks
(βG ,βB ), the covariance matrices (Vε ,Vν ) and the sequence of state vectors ΦT = {ϕ1 , . . . , ϕT }. We
start oﬀ with non-informative Gaussian priors for these parameters Ψ =(ηA ,ηB ,ηG , γG ,γB ,βG ,βB ).
We also assume that εt and νt are independent and the priors for Vε and Vν are assumed to be
inverse Wishart. Given these assumptions, the posteriors distributions of Vε and Vν are inverse
Wishart and the posteriors for the parameters (ηA ,ηB ,ηG , γG ,γB ,βG ,βB ) are Gaussian.
Let D t = {Yt , D t−1 } denote all the information available to the researcher till time t, e.g. the
clicks and impressions till time t. We use a forward-ﬁltering and backward smoothing algorithm
(e.g. Rutz and Bucklin, 2011) to sample the state spaces, Φt |D t . Then we sample the parameters
(ηA ,ηB ,ηG , γG ,γB ,βG ,βB ) given Φt and D t . These estimation steps are described below.

Step 1: Simulation for ΦT
i) For t = 1, . . . , T , compute mt and Σt , the mean and the variance of the state space at time t.
mt and Σt are derived sequentially from the priors m0 and Σ0 according to the procedure outlined
in West and Harrison (1997, Chapter 4).
ii) Filter-forward step: For t = T , sample p(ϕT |D T ) from the posterior distribution N (mT , ΣT ).
iii) Backward-smoothing step: For t = T, . . . , 1, sample p(ϕt−1 |ϕt , D T ) conditional on the latest draw ϕt .
Step 2: Sampling from p(Ψ, Vε , Vν |ΦT , DT )
We sample the parameters Ψ, Vε and Vν sequentially. This is reasonable as the elements of the
transition matrix, drift vectors and the error terms are assumed to be independent of each other.
Based on these assumptions the Gibbs sampler can be used in a straight-forward manner to draw
samples of ηA , ηB , ηG , γG , γB , βG , βB , Vε and Vν separately.
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